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Thinking Multiplicity without the Concept: 





Near the beginning of Genesis, Michel Serres declares that the aim of the book is to speak of the multiple as such without recourse to the concept.​[1]​ The impetus for this challenge arises from Serres’ determination that we should not succumb to the temptations of reason, or at least those of a certain kind of rationalism that has encouraged us to find sense only where there is unity. Unity, of course, comes in different forms; historically, philosophers have looked for “a principle, a system, an integration”, but also for the building blocks of elements, atoms or numbers that are brought together to form the unity (G 16, 2) . Yet, as Serres observes, our attempts to make sense of the world by casting unity over multiplicity appears destined to fail because in the end “we are as little sure of the one as of the multiple” (G 16, 3); the indivisible turns out to be composite, the simple complex and the irreducible recedes as our analysis advances. Losing sight of the elementary, we turn back to search for the universal, but here, too, the task seems hopeless. As a consequence of this disappointment, writes Serres, in more recent times attention has shifted to relations, with individual elements treated as the nexus of exchanges and systems as a network of connections. In both cases, relations are thought to take precedence over beings and the formal structures of phenomena are dealt with before their content (and phenomenology lends itself to this as much as structuralism). Serres’ concern is that in this new pursuit of sense, the form of reason that disappointed in the search for ontological unities has merely been transposed, and that it may disappoint again. Could there be, he asks, a “basic unit of relationship” (G 17, 4)? He is not sure. In fact, he is not even sure that he (or anyone else) can truly understand what it means to speak of relations existing in this way, as if there could be a formal determination of relations as such to which all cases must then conform. For we have yet to find out, he warns, “how relation is transformed into being, and being into relation” (G 18, 4) – a cautionary note against thinking that a switch from an ontology of substance to an ontology of relations will be a quick and easy solution to our problems. 
As was Bachelard before him, Serres is convinced that we see simplicity and unity only where we have not actually looked hard enough. They are illusions arising from a lack of attention to the fine grain of experience, and in the same way concepts generally mask looser assemblages, “multiplicities that are most often highly dispersed” (G 17, 3). From the beginning, Serres’ writing has been a response to this predicament, and his determination to remain fascinated by the milieu of everyday experience marks him out as perhaps the most decisively anti-platonic philosopher in modern times (though he is rarely a polemicist. He has always been wary of the way knowledge is treated as full or empty, as total or null; “whereas commonly we know a bit, a meagre amount, enough, quite a bit” (G 19, 5). In the same way, we exist through sights and sounds, history, time, collectives, and the hubbub of life that cannot be easily subsumed beneath a unity. Yet even set against the background of this longstanding concern, Genesis stands out by virtue of its explicit intention “to conceive the multiple as such, directly, without ever allowing unification to come to its aid” (G 18, 4). It is a striking proposal, in so far as it would seem to require both a concept and the determination of multiplicity as a formal unity, thereby betraying its declared purpose. Moreover, the attempt to explain how this can be done draws Serres towards an ambiguous position in which at first it can seem hard to say whether he is engaged in the attempt to think multiplicity directly or is standing back to reflect on the tools, ideas and approaches that make it possible; each of which, again, would be deeply problematic. In fact, this traditional distinction between a discourse and a meta-level reflection distorts the intent and practice of Serres’ work, which, if one were to retain these same terms, tends to dissolve the surface dividing a description from a reflection on its conditions into a complex and dynamic region. What may seem to be a methodological reflection, or an account of the fundamental structure underlying the propagation of multiplicity turns out to be implicated in the reality it describes, or to which it gives apparently consistent form. As I shall outline later, it is this approach, arising from Serres’ materialism and in particular his atomism, that makes possible what might be called an ‘indirect ontology’. One of the most striking features of this indirect ontology is its apparent continuity with epistemology, in so far as the conditions of being are not radically separate from the conditions of knowledge (for reasons quite different to those proposed by idealism). Above all, however, to think multiplicity in the way Serres proposes is to embark on an adventure that is radical in its resistance to unity, and as such to engage in a practice that is openly ethical in its aspirations.
There are of course precedents in the history of philosophy for thinking the multiple. Atomism is perhaps the most significant, and is one of the two principal influences on Serres’ thought and writing. We’ll come to atomism shortly, but first a few words about Serres’ early study of mathematical models in Leibniz and the form of unity that brings them together as a system.​[2]​ When reading Leibniz, Serres remarks, one can initially be disoriented by the array of approaches placed alongside one another: dynamical, logical, ontological, empirical, mathematical and so on. In reaching for an understanding of the whole, one finds oneself asking whether or not they are all consistent with one other, and which takes priority. However, Serres points out that these are the wrong questions to ask in relation to Leibniz, for whom each approach serves as a possible introduction to others, without any one of them being fundamental or imposing a single set of formal constraints on the rest. For example, in mathematics, it may be that in order to learn or teach a particular approach or discipline, one treats it as independent, having its own concepts, rules and first principles, linked by an irreversible chain of deductive reasoning. In truth, however,  this order may be little more than a heuristic device that does not give a true picture of mathematics as such, for which given sub-disciplines, and even a given concept, figure or number, may be the point at which a series of different approaches intersect: “a constellation of ways of access, all equally rigorous, all equally deductive” (L 12). Multiplying the possible chains of reasoning in this way strengthens rather than weakens the links traced and enriches the analysis, giving rise to an image of order as a network or fabric of connections in which each point is linked to some or all of the rest, and in which the pattern of these connections form distinct regions in the whole. These have the status of models that provide a way of seeing and understanding other regions, without determining the laws that govern them, and thus also without expressing the laws that uniquely determine the whole. In the absence of such a demonstrable formal unity, the existence of a ‘whole’ or system may look to be in doubt, yet the idea of the whole still has sense, in that each of these models can serve as the key for piecing together the wider network of relations. The mathematical conception of the system as a whole is not itself a particular mathematical theory, and to understand the different models systematically (that is, as a unity) is not to model the system itself by drafting a single formal account. Rather, the mathematical conception of the system as a whole is the systematic relation of all the mathematical models (L 52). Since God alone can bring together all the possible variations into a synoptic view of the whole, as finite beings the best we can achieve is to move from one to the next in a series of iterations. In so far as we can speak of a concept at all in this finite condition, it emerges from the connections that thinking itself must forge by “a kind of induction, parallelism or similitude, the structure that analogically unifies the different models appears by way of their iteration” (L 5). To conceive of the whole system is, on this account, to trace connections in thought, to link different regions or models, beginning and ending at different points. This approach to the question of unity is also influenced by the work of the Bourbaki group in mathematics and it remains deeply influential on Serres throughout his work. For example, more than twenty years later, in Le tiers instruit (The Troubadour of Knowledge), he writes: “When you hear or compose variations on a given theme, don’t you sometimes ask yourself if the theme itself doesn’t develop like one variation among others? Simpler, doubtless, purer, shorter certainly, but why separate it from them? There is as much distance between the variations as between them and the theme, which nothing prevents me from calling a variation on one of the variations. Why prejudge it as more stable and more centred than they? Yes, the theme is nothing but one of the variations”.​[3]​  However, as in his account of Leibniz, Serres insists on the absence of any single key to the series, which can therefore be placed into a variety of different orders, with different starting points providing different possible itineraries through the composition of the elements into a whole.
The concept, then, is not merely a work in progress; it is a work with no clear destination, and necessarily multiple paths of development. So how is one to proceed? In fact, the question of how to think one’s way ‘correctly’ through a rational system is just a particular case of a more general question about the order intrinsic to processes of transformation. Following Leibniz in setting aside the image of the line in favour of the network, Serres denies that any process can be adequately described in terms of linear sequences, simply with breaks or changes in value: “A real transformation is always essentially complicated” (L 285). With this in mind, he proposes that any given process can be differentiated into a number of elementary linear times, and that one can then “project the multiplicity of these lines in a space of representation” where they define a complex surface on which there are local patterns of order and relation. Since the system as a whole is the ensemble of relations between models (rather than a fixed form that determines these relations), the equivalence of the system as a whole with the formalisation of that system through thinking occurs in time understood as a complex surface. If one were to speak of the ‘concept’ at all here, it would be the form in which a multiplicity presents itself, but not, as in Kant, the timeless form. Rather, the concept (of the system as a whole, or indeed of any transformation) is itself temporal, and, moreover, complex. As in a group of variations, this idea changes across the range of Serres’ work as it is inflected by different influences, but it remains easily recognisable throughout, as we shall see shortly when we turn to Genesis and see Serres take up the challenge of thinking multiplicity without the concept. However, before we do that, a brief word about atomism.  
In 1977, Serres published La naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce (The Birth of Physics), a form of free ranging reflection on De rerum natura, the exposition by Lucretius of Epicurean atomism.​[4]​ In this remarkable book, Serres portrays Lucretius as the exponent of a rigorous and surprisingly contemporary form of materialism in which forms of order, from galaxies to weather systems and the human mind, and from physics to history and morality, are all the outcome of a single process, repeated across different levels and producing a potentially endless series of variations. What in this text he calls the ‘general model’ begins with an infinite number of atoms raining down through the void in parallel lines. Without cause, and quite unpredictably, there occur tiny deviations in the path of some atoms (the clinamen), which leads to collisions between atoms, turbulence and the formation of vortices in which atoms and combinations of atoms settle into patterns of regular movement. These vortices are the order we see all around us in the physical world and in every sphere of natural, social, economic and moral life. All order is therefore dynamic, a nearly stable recurrence whose dissolution will at some point begin to accelerate, the order breaking down and returning the atoms to the cosmic flux, perhaps to reappear in fresh configurations of order elsewhere. 
Because order is the outcome of an essentially aleatory process, there are no laws that determine how atoms combine to form groups and stable structures. Physical law is understood as the pattern of regularity that emerges from this process, as a kind of alliance, and like all alliances it is localised in both space and time; that is, the laws of nature in our corner of the universe will almost certainly not be those found in some other corner, and since the clinamen will introduce new and unexpected movements and combinations, the laws will even vary over time in our own neighbourhood. Moreover, this localisation in the emergence of order is not operative only at the level of physical reality. Although Lucretius’s account describes history, the weather, morality, biology and much else besides as deriving from the movement of atoms in the void, the absence of any fundamental and universal laws governing the movement of atoms (and the absence of any basic metric properties of the void), means that these higher order structures cannot be explained by reducing them to a more basic reality from which they emerge. So, for example, Serres can, and does, say repeatedly that morality is physics without conceding anything to physical reductionism. To put this another way, the sense of locality found in the spread of regularities at the level of the physical world is reproduced between discursive realities. Moving from physics to economics, or from history to morality, is like moving from one corner of the universe to another; there will be no predetermined way to move from the local to the global, and not even a marked out path from one locale to another – and all this in spite of the fact that in every region (physical and discursive) there operate the same principles of atoms moving in the void, turbulence, vortices, and so forth. The system is the pattern of links, but as one does not begin with a whole that sets the conditions for the possibility of each part, the links have to be made. 
The material process that has given rise to the local regions propagates a distribution of similarity and difference, the isomorphism between regions (physical or discursive) is never perfect, and the analogical movement by which one traces links between them is only ever partial. Moreover, the act of thinking and writing is itself a material act that intervenes in the same process, potentially leading to the modification of the pattern of links. Echoing Serres’ description of the system in Leibniz, all this means that a conception of the system as a whole (indeed, of any given system of related regions) is the relation of all the regions – and that to conceive of this totality of relations one must map them, and, because there is no formal and invariant set of relations binding the regions into a whole, the map you end up with will depend on where you begin and the path you strike. However, like all echoes, the echo of Serres’ reading of Leibniz in his reading of Lucretius is an imperfect copy; one might say that a certain deviation has occurred along the path from one to the other. In Leibniz, bringing the totality under a single conception presented itself as essentially an infinite task, but one whose possibility was underpinned by the existence of God and actually achievable only by him. By contrast, De rerum natura openly declares its intent to provide an account of the universe and everything in it without recourse to divine principles. Indeed, it is not just that Lucretius avoids appealing to a single and all powerful god; his account deliberately and explicitly rules out any such appeal. In the Lucretian universe a complete and perfect being possessing a single concept of the universe as a whole is impossible even in principle. It therefore does not matter how many times one thinks through a system along different routes and from different points of departure, the form emerging is neither stable nor unique. The universe is infinite, and open; forever susceptible to complex interactions with neighbouring forces and currents. There is still mapping, but this time it is more decisively local. To put this in terms of multiplicity, the most significant way that the atomist account introduces multiplicity is less in the basic idea of atoms (which if treated as ontologically independent would still be unities) than in the endless possibilities of variation, formation and reformation that they underpin. 
Now let us turn back to Genesis to see how the material I have set out thus far helps us to see how Serres pursues his aim to think the multiple as such, without the concept. I shall focus on the chapter ‘The Birth of Time’ that arguably stands at the heart of the book as a whole.  
At first, it can be hard to say exactly what is happening in this chapter. In brief, Serres writes about the idea of multiplicity, disparages our tendency to look for and find unity of different kinds, and arrives at an account of time as the emergence of patterns of repetition or redundancy from a chaotic flux. Yet, in doing so, he runs a twofold risk: on the one hand, he appears to be tackling the idea of multiplicity directly, even risking terms such as ‘pure multiplicity’ – and this seems to run counter to his intention to do without the concept; and on the other hand, his text touches on a huge variety of topics, frequently switches terms and seems unwilling to provide the kind of systematic analysis that one might normally expect from an account of multiplicity as such.​[5]​ Both concerns are misplaced, as Serres holds to a strategy that undertakes an engagement with multiplicity in thought and word that is quite singular, indeed remarkably so given philosophy’s preoccupation with the idea in recent times. 
In the middle of this chapter, Serres, typically drawing inspiration from our ordinary experience, looks at time and finds that it is at both continuous and discontinuous, that it becomes expansive and contracts, that it passes and does not pass; in short that it seems to defy all formalisation. Lacunary and sporadic, a loose mosaic, time is, he concludes, a kind of multiplicity in which there are few discrete units or none at all, but in which there is some minimal degree of repetition or redundancy; that is, the possibility of repetition is at least not entirely absent. It is not a flux that can be differentiated into fluxions, though it can become one; it is not a set, though it can become one of those, too. If the minimal redundancy increases and the multiplicity becomes more ordered, time crystallizes into a space or spaces. As such, time is a threshold region between disorder and redundancy of space. It is “the first injection of redundancy into a pure multiplicity” (G 189, 117). By “pure multiplicity”, Serres means utter chaos, a “chaotic multiplicity”, or “noise”. Beyond the bounds of all determination, noise operates in Serres as an analogue of the infinite, a resource from which the order of time emerges in the relatively finite form of a more or less “ordered multiplicity”, yet without being determined as a negation, as though it exhibited an inner logic, or were separated by a clear limit from the non-temporal. Serres’ conception of multiplicity is therefore suspended between two extremes: chaotic multiplicity resistant to all determination, and the ordered multiplicity of a collection of well defined elements; an intermediary region that is predominantly temporal until its variation slows towards the fixed proportions and patterns that characterise space. However, as this slowing is never definitive, time never disappears altogether, and to conceive order or identity is also in some sense to conceive the noise that circulates as an ineliminable principle of creative disruption. 
To think multiplicity is, for Serres, to engage this intermediary region of emergent time in such a way as to avoid offering any outright determination of its structure. The multiple is approached as a mixture of pure and ordered multiplicities, and since such mixtures have no general form, Serres describes them in their specificity. Moreover, these are not direct descriptions, as his concern is above all with their dynamic character, their mode of development and their action. A mixture, therefore, falls between a stable structure with an identifiable form and the particularity of cases endlessly in variation. Whatever new detail is revealed in a mixture will itself be susceptible to further change or further specification as it is drawn into consideration with other mixtures or examined more closely still.​[6]​ Unlike the progressive profiling of adumbrations in phenomenology, this process is open and endless. For example, Serres begins ‘The Birth of Time’, by suggesting that rigid classifications in religion, sociology and anthropology should be recast as temporary stages in a Darwinian evolution. In doing so, he is claiming that if one looks closely enough, patterns of Darwinian evolution can be found in religion, sociology and anthropology, but also that their formalisation on the basis of an understanding of Darwin’s work in biology is merely one possible route along which to explore the relation between these different disciplines. Considering the principles of sovereignty, struggle and production, personified by Jupiter, Mars and Quirinus respectively, Serres recalls Dumezil’s identification of fury as a feature recognizably common to them all, the inchoate condition from which they arise and which persists through them, which Serres calls ‘noise’. In the case of political history, conflict does not originate between classes, it is rather that classes themselves arise to quell the fury that precedes their formation.​[7]​ Class itself is a “threshold effect” constituting itself in relation to the fury and noise to which it gives at least a temporarily ordered expression. Other examples covered by Serres include the construction of dams, the language of science, and administration. In each case, classes codify a process Serres calls violence, flux, life or invention, and while it is entirely possible to describe this coding, he reminds us that philosophical and scientific descriptions have only ever captured the process in the dialect of classification characteristic to specific regions; that is, in idioms that aspire to purity at the expense of their relations to the discursive forces around them. It is to counter this tendency that Serres turns his attention to mixtures, resisting the lure of unity and the ideal to trace the exposure of thinking to the noise from which it emerges, where the understanding lies close to sensibility and time is the giving and taking of shape between chaotic multiplicity and the spatial order of concepts and categories.  It is perhaps in order to sustain this proximity that he is so determined to dispense with the concept in its traditional sense. 
Now, if the avoidance of the concept as a unifying form recalls Leibniz, for whom the system emerges through the iteration of models, we are also reminded of Lucretius, for whom, even in principle, there could be no system as a whole, and for whom multiplicity extended right down from local patterns of order to the disordered process from which they emerged. But if in addition we are still tempted to think of Kant, and to say that Serres seems to aim at gathering intuitions without concepts, we should also remember that such an effort is only absurd as long as one regards the synthesis of intuitions and concepts as an occurrence in transcendental consciousness. Against this supposition, the influence of Lucretian atomism convinces Serres that the work of synthesis is a material process. The ‘pure process’ he intends to think is a time of things and of life, the weaving combinations that slow the process down until they are themselves gradually undone (G 158, 96). To think this process from itself is not to abandon all concepts and forms of unity, as though understanding could free itself from its own beginning, it is to pitch thinking into the turbulent waters where concepts and unities are forming. It is to situate thinking as near as possible to pure multiplicity, to noise, without either imposing a structure upon it or slipping, along with it, into chaos. This is all well and good, one might object, but Serres’ use of terms such as chaos, noise and turbulence provide him with a kind of meta-language in which to describe multiplicity, in spite of his intention to avoid any such recourse. However, such an objection would fall wide of its mark, because the sense of these terms in Serres’ work itself emerges from a particular milieu. When ‘turbulence’ appears in accounts of weather, language, history, or thinking, Serres has taken an idea formed in one site and used it as a means to trace the codification of another; and the turbulence deriving from an analysis of weather systems is neither the turbulence of fury in history, nor the turbulence of language or the body. In the same way, ‘multiplicity’ is not a single concept beneath which every case of multiplicity can be presented. However rich the account given by Riemann, and handed down through the philosophical tradition by Husserl and Bergson, it is only one possible account, and quite apart from this mathematical conception, a sense of multiplicity could be derived from the crowd, from language, from stormy weather, and from many other phenomena. For Serres, cases like these are irreducible to one another, and no one sense has priority over any other. To assume that such a priority existed would be to demand all things, insofar as they exist at all, conform to the same condition of unity, and thereby also to insist on a single form of relation between the elements of all multiplicities. It would, that is, mean operating with what amounts to a formal ontology of difference. Serres leads us away from this potential pitfall, his work gradually reinforcing the intuition that the form of relation, and thus of difference, between elements in different multiples is itself variable. As a consequence, when Serres portrays multiplicity by writing about crowds,  clouds, historical movements, class  –  all the different forms of temporal mix on which he touches – he describes not only a particular aggregate, but implicitly also the kind of difference it embodies and propagates.
This shifting environment might at first seem to be a playground in which any determination of a given concept will be right somewhere, but there is an immense rigour to Serres’ writing. It lies, at least in part, in his attentiveness to the nuance of translation between neighbourhoods of thought and writing. As terms move between sites of occurrence and recurrence, they bear something of their material provenance with them into the new relations they form, and the translation of terms is therefore merely the most visible point of a broader translation of structure, itself continually in evolution.  The materialism of Serres’ thought is such that the messenger terms themselves are first taken from near at hand, in concrete examples from the milieu of ordinary experience (which includes literature, art and science); anything else would conceal an aspiration towards idealism wholly at odds with the temperament of his work. Moreover, this materialism involves the deformation and reformation of discourses by the movement of terms in translation, and thereby a continual shift in the formal character of experience. Serres’ aim is not to arrive at a final determination of groups, aggregates, crowds, and flows, since they cannot be defined as wholes or units without neglecting the disorder and variation that continues to circulate in them, however slowly, and thereby neglecting also the complex communication at their borders. To respond to this circulation of disorder – this turbulence – is in Serres’ own terms to “negotiate the noise” in which all order is bathed (G 217, 136), and the degree to which someone or something (a science or a piece of technology) can do this is a index of its capacity for invention. To have a low capacity for such invention is to be condemned to the redundancy of a rigid process, an inflexible schema, a stable history, or the refuge of instinct or institutions. By contrast, to be inventive, for Serres, requires placing oneself within the material process of synthesis, close to noise or chaos, at a point where things and language are forming patterns of redundancy. This may be to encourage the formation of new patterns of relation, but may also involve disrupting such patterns where they have become sclerotic and an obstacle to communication. For Serres, it is the philosopher who is best equipped for this practice, which he describes as knowing how to regulate the liberty that comes with a breakdown in order, while at the same time knowing how to liberate oneself from regulations (G 170, 104). To “regulate liberty” in this sense is not to legislate in the orthodox sense of applying a law to govern a set of possible phenomena (to define them as possible), but rather to intervene in a situation of relative disorder in such a way as to promote the formation of regularities, tracing analogical relations between domains, illuminating the operation of concepts across different discursive neighbourhoods, or initiating patterns of regularity by the act of thinking and writing. It is to pitch into those regions where order, beginning to emerge or close to breaking down, shows signs of movement to which one’s own thought may give a new acceleration. This sense of invention is quite distinct from modification and couldn’t be further removed from the idea of creation ex nihilo, in so far as it begins with the recognition that things are generally a poor fit to the identities we habitually give them, that they are at once more and less than what is allowed by the formal conditions of their existence. One has to begin with mixtures, impure hybrids at once enlivened and destabilised by the noise within them and around them. And we must be ready to let them speak in a variety of languages and ready ourselves to try out new idioms. In this way, thinking multiplicity is an inventive engagement with noise in the course of which one maps previously excluded regions between known identities (the third), allowing them to enter into a less violent or chaotic relation with the order around them. 
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